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In this paper, we identify a radically new viewpoint on the collective
behaviour of groups of intelligent agents. We first develop a highly
general abstract model for the possible future lives that these agents
may encounter as a result of their decisions. In the context of these
possible futures, we show that the causal entropic principle, whereby
agents follow behavioural rules that maximise their entropy over all
paths through the future, predicts many of the observed features
of social interactions between individuals in both human and animal
groups. Our results indicate that agents are often able to maximise
their future path entropy by remaining cohesive as a group, and that
this cohesion leads to collectively intelligent outcomes that depend
strongly on the distribution of the number of future paths that are
possible. We derive social interaction rules that are consistent with
maximum-entropy group behaviour for both discrete and continuous
decision spaces. Our analysis further predicts that social interactions
are likely to be fundamentally based on Weber’s law of response to
proportional stimuli, supporting many studies that find a neurologi-
cal basis for this stimulus-response mechanism, and providing a novel
basis for the common assumption of linearly additive ‘social forces’
in simulation studies of collective behaviour.
collective behaviour, collective intelligence, social forces, causal entropic principle,
maximum entropy, Galton–Watson process, Yule process
Collective decision making and the emergence of collectiveintelligence are key areas of study in the fields of animal
behaviour and social science. Since Francis Galton observed
the power of the central limit theorem to provide an accurate
estimate for the weight of a bull by averaging individual opin-
ions (as told by James Surowiecki [1]), the ability of groups to
make decisions that improve on the accuracy of the individ-
uals comprising them has continued to surprise researchers.
Human [2], animal [3], and even algorithmic [4] groups have
been shown to improve on individual performance in estima-
tion problems (Galton’s bull example), navigation [5], identi-
fying superior options [6], and prediction tasks [7]. In an age
of unprecedented global connectivity of individuals through
web and mobile internet technologies, the opportunity to un-
derstand the origins of social behaviour and leverage collective
intelligence is greater than ever before.
Much is already known about how the transfer of informa-
tion by individuals can lead to intelligent outcomes on the
level of the group. Models of social contagion [8, 9, 10], quo-
rum decision making [11, 12, 13], Bayesian social decision rules
[14, 15], and information cascades [16, 17] all provide a detailed
theory for how each agent in a group can acquire and use infor-
mation from other individuals’ actions, and under what con-
ditions this leads to improved or disrupted decision making by
those individuals.
However, when we face the challenge of understanding the
collective behaviour of the millions of connected individuals
now on our planet, the prospect of beginning that process at
the level of a single individual decision maker is daunting. Sta-
tistical mechanics, and particularly the principle of maximum
entropy, provide an expedient methodology for studying the
behaviour of large systems with many interacting elements.
More recently, the principle of maximum entropy production
(reviewed by [18]) has enabled these methods to be applied
to more-general flow systems outside of the classical notion
of equilibrium, and causal entropy [19] has been proposed to
extend this to the case where the individual elements of the
system exhibit intelligence.
Statistical mechanics has already provided a fruitful route
to understanding collective behaviour, in particular collective
motion, via the abstraction of social forces: pseudo-forces
that can modify an agent’s energy depending on its align-
ment with or proximity to other individuals [20], or explicitly
provide a physical force to alter the agents’ motion [21, 22].
Such approaches have been able to demonstrate why human
and animal groups undergo phase transitions between differ-
ent quasi-equilibria in analogy with the phase transitions seen
in statistical-mechanical systems, and have been developed to
a particularly high degree of sophistication in the study of hu-
man crowds [23], where they are used to understand disasters
such as at Hillborough (1989) and the Love Parade (2010)
[24]. However, social forces are a convenient abstraction of
psychological choices, and therefore are typically adjusted to
fit observations, rather than being based on the fundamental
logic of interactions.
In this paper we demonstrate a new way to understand col-
lective behaviour, from a purely entropic viewpoint, without
any specification of social information transfer, social forces,
or individual interaction rules. We do this by building on
the causal entropic framework of [19]. By specifying our un-
certainty about the long-term futures of a group of agents,
we will show that the decisions this group make now can be
predicted. We will show that the social rules of interaction,
and the social forces assumed in many studies of collective be-
haviour emerge not from any consideration of the adaptiveness
of the agents’ choices, nor from any consideration of their im-
mediate needs or desires, but simply from a tacit assumption
that their long-term actions are maximally uncertain.
The causal entropic principle
The causal entropic principle is an assertion about our knowl-
edge of a system’s future path through state space. This is
fundamentally an argument from a principle of maximum ig-
norance – we deem ourselves to be as uncertain as possible
about the path an agent will take through all the future op-
tions available. As we shall show, this counter-intuitively pro-
vides us with information about which choices the agent is
likely to make now. In previous work, Wissner-Gross & Freer
[19] derived a ‘causal entropic force’ that drives systems to-
wards locally available new microstates that permit a greater
number of available paths through future state space. In the
cases presented by [19], this force acts upon particles moving
in a continuous, bounded Euclidean space. As ergodic prin-
ciple for equilibria states that any microstate of the particles
in the gas is equally probable, so in a causal-entropic system
all available future paths are assigned an equal probability.
Therefore the probability of any new reachable microstate be-
ing selected is proportional to the number of future state-space
paths that it makes available. This causal entropic force was
shown to cause a diverse range of systems to behave in ap-
parently intelligent ways, mimicking for example animal use
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Fig. 1. Schematic of a toy example illustrating the causal entropic collective
model. A group of agents at the root of the tree must choose between two options:
‘A’ and ‘B’. Two possible worlds exist: one where option A leads to four more choices
and B to one, or one where A leads to one more choice and B to four. The decision
rule for the group that maximises their future path entropy averaged over the two
possible worlds is a mixture of two binomial distributions, shown in Figure 2.
of tools, or complex co-operation. Inspired by these examples,
we consider whether the same principle can predict the inter-
actions between individuals in groups that are the foundation
of collective cognition and intelligence.
Application to collective decisions: A toy example. Consider
a group of agents who must decide between two options, A
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Fig. 2. An example of predicted decisions by a group of eight agents in a ‘toy’
world: choosing one (unknown) option leads to four possible future paths, and the
other to one. A future path is assigned at random to each agent, averaging over pos-
sible configurations of the future world, where the four options may be behind choice
A or B. The predicted distribution of agent choices is a weighted sum of binomial dis-
tributions, with far greater cohesion than expected if each agent would independently
choose a door at random.
and B. In this example, the information about the future is
the following: behind one door lies four more options; behind
the other, there is only one. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Assuming that the door with four options is equally likely to
be either A or B, what distribution of the agents between the
two options will maximise their expected entropy, over the
possible future paths to the final level of the branching tree?
For any given branching tree, entropy is maximised by mak-
ing any assignment of the agents to each future path that
reaches the final level equally probable. Because the graph of
choices is a tree, each final option is associated with a single
unique path through the future space; therefore, it is equiva-
lent to assign agents randomly to the final nodes on the tree.
We aim to find a consistent distribution of agents that max-
imises the path-entropy over all possible worlds – a general
way for the agents to organise themselves such that their en-
tropy will be as high as possible, on average, in all the worlds
they might encounter. Therefore we take each possible tree,
weighted by its probability of existing, and assign a uniform
multinomial distribution of the agents to its final nodes. We
then feed this distribution back to the first choices (in this case,
A and B) that the agents must make. Denoting by N the total
number of agents, and by A and B the number choosing each
door, this model implies that the probability distribution for
the number choosing door A is a weighted sum of two binomial
distributions, one with p = 4/5, the other with p = 1/5. Each
has a weight of 1/2, since each has a 50% chance of existing:
P (A) =
1
2
(
N
A
)
4
5
A 1
5
N−A
+
1
2
(
N
A
)
1
5
A 4
5
N−A
=
1
2
(
N
A
)
4A + 4N−A
5N
. [1]
For the case of eight agents picking between these two options,
the expected distribution is shown in Figure 2, alongside the
distribution we would expect if each agent chose a door in-
dependently at random. The exact form of the distribution
varies with the total number of agents, as well as with the
. . .
BA
Fig. 3. Schematic illustrating the general branching process of future choices.
Each choice leads to an unknown number of future options to choose between, cre-
ating an expanding tree of possible future paths. The number of new options is
generated from a stationary probability distribution, such that each new branch forms
an independent and identically distributed tree, and the total number of options at
the top of the tree is distributed according to a Galton–Watson (GW) process. If
the probability of generating no new choices is greater than zero, dead-ends can form
(black circle) and there is a probability α that the tree will become extinct. The
causal entropic collective model assumes that agents will be uniformly distributed on
the final options (red circles), weighted by the probability of the tree being generated
by a GW process.
2
“mann˙garnett˙arxiv” — 2014/9/25 — 0:20 — page 3 — #3
number of future options. The figure clearly shows that the
causal entropic principle, picking randomly from future op-
tions rather than the immediately available ones, induces a
greater degree of cohesion on the agents – they are much more
likely to choose the same option. This cohesive ‘force’ increases
as the difference between the number of options behind each
door increases, despite the agents having no information about
which door actually contains the greater number of options.
Collective causal entropic model
We now expand the toy example above to consider more gen-
eral collective decisions, where the information about the num-
ber of future options is less precise. Letting P (nA) and P (nB)
describe the probability of finding nA and nB future paths
behind doors A and B, respectively (assuming for now that
these are independent), Equation 1 generalises to an infinite
sum of probability-weighted binomial distributions.
P (A | N) =
(
N
A
) ∞∑
nA=0
∞∑
nB=0
P (nA)P (nB)
nAAn
(N−A)
B
(nA + nB)N
=
(
N
A
)∫ 1
R=0
P (R)RA(1−R)N−A dR, [2]
where R = nA
(nA+nB)
. Clearly the key factor in Equation 2
that controls the number of agents A choosing door A is the
ratio R, the proportion of future options that lie behind door
A. The problem of estimating the behaviour of the agents is
thus largely a problem of estimating P (R), the probability of
this ratio.
A probability distribution for the number of possible futures.
In general the number of future paths that either A or B may
lead to may take any distribution. However, for the purposes
of deriving the consequences of a model of collective decision
making, we must determine a specific form for P (nA) and
P (nB), and most importantly for P (R). We propose the fol-
lowing method: confronted with a decision, the agents can
represent their belief about the futures available behind each
option as a continuing branching tree, in which each branch
leads to an unknown number of future choices (illustrated in
Figure 3). The number of new choices generated on each
branch is determined by some fixed distribution. This is a
Galton–Watson (GW) process [25].
We are interested in the number of nodes on this branching
tree at after some time window h – the height of the tree. The
Kesten–Stigum theorem [26] states that for any GW process,
the distribution on the number of nodes converges to an ex-
ponential distribution, conditional on the tree not becoming
extinct: Thus, including the possibility of extinction, for large
h, the number of options is distributed as
P (n) ' αδ(0) + (1− α) 1
ζh
exp
(
− n
ζh
)
, [3]
where ζ is the mean number of descendants of each node in
each generation, α is the extinction probability and δ is the
Dirac delta function. The extinction probability is determined
by the fixed point of the generating function for the number
of new choices generated on each branching. We will treat α
as an adjustable parameter of our model. The behaviour of
agents on this tree is determined, via Equation 2, by the ratio
distribution P (R) = P ( nA
nA+nB
). Since our assumption is that
each new branch of the tree forms a independent GW process,
this takes a simple form:
P (R) = P
(
nA/(nA + nB)
)
=
1
1 + α
(
(1− α) + α(δ(0) + δ(1))). [4]
This follows from noting that the ratio X/(X + Y ) of two
identically distributed exponential random variables X and
Y is a uniformly distributed random variable on (0, 1), and
considering the special cases where either nA or nB is zero. In-
stances where both nA and nB are zero are undefined and do
not contribute to the calculation. The Dirac delta functions
at zero and one are the result of the possible extinction of one
branch or the other. The final distribution over the choices of
N agents can be obtained via Equation 2, and mirrors the dis-
tribution of R, with an equal probability of 1 to N − 1 agents
choosing door A, and higher probabilities for either 0 or N
agents to do so if α > 0. An equivalent model exists for a tree
embedded in continuous time: the Yule process [27, 28]. Thus
the distribution derived for P (R) does not depend on whether
the branching process for possible future trees is discrete or
continuous in time.
More than two choices. The same principles used to derive
the distribution of the agents over two choices can be applied
to an arbitrarily higher number of options. To do so, we need
the following fact: the proportional ratios of i.i.d. exponential
random variables X1, X2, . . . , XK are beta distributed:
Xi∑K
j=1Xj
∼ β(1,K − 1). [5]
Using this fact, along with the special cases where one or more
of the trees behind each option goes extinct, we may generalise
Equation 4. We have the following probability distribution for
R, the proportion of future paths behind one choice, in the case
where there are three options:
P (R) =
1
1− α3
[
α(1− α2)δ(0) + α2(1− α)δ(1)
+ 2α(1− α)2β(R, 1, 1) + (1− α)3β(R, 1, 2)
]
, [6]
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Fig. 4. The log ratio of the probability that a group of N agents make the same
choice from K independent options within the causal entropic (CE) model, relative
to random chance. The ratio is always above one for K > 1 and increases with both
K and N , indicating the causal entropic model’s bias towards consensus collective
decision-making.
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where β(R; a, b) represents the beta probability distribution
on R with parameters a and b. As α becomes large, the fac-
tors multiplying the beta probability distributions tend to zero
faster than the delta function terms, and consensus is still en-
forced. Each door shares an equal probability of being the
consensus choice, reflected in the greater chance that R = 0
than R = 1. This result mirrors the experimentally observed
tendency of, for example, fish to remain as a group when pre-
sented with three options [29], though it should be noted that
this framework does not provide a clear way to model groups
with conflicting preferences – a limitation addressed in the
discussion. For all but the highest values of α, the probabil-
ity of a consensus decreases with the number of options M ,
implying the common-sense notion that the probability of all
agents choosing the same option is reduced as the number of
equivalent choices becomes very high.
Consequences
Consensus decision making. The causal entropic model pre-
dicts a tendency for groups of agents to reach a consensus. In
the case where the extinction probability is greater than zero,
there is a strong entropic ‘bonus’ for agents to remain as a
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Fig. 5. The social interaction rule implied by the causal entropic model. Panel A
shows the probability one individual will choose option A rather than B, conditioned
on A and B agents already committing to each option. The resulting probabil-
ity is a match to Weber’s law with one ‘pseudo-observation’, P (A | A,B) =
(A+ 1)/(A+B + 2), as shown in panel B.
single group, specified by the Dirac delta functions in Equa-
tions 4 and 6. However, even in the case where the probability
of all but one future tree becoming extinct is effectively zero,
such as when α is zero or very small, or when the number of
choices is very high, there is still a strong bias towards consen-
sus decisions. For example, in the case that α = 0, in Figure
4 we plot the probability that a group of agents of size 2, 3
or 4 will choose the same option from K independent choices,
compared to the probability of this occurring if each agent
makes a choice uniformly at random.
Social interaction rules. The entropic prediction of collective
consensus is fundamentally a group-level analysis. Most stud-
ies in collective decision making have started from a model
of how individuals react to the decisions of others. What in-
dividual interaction rules would be necessary to produce the
group-level behaviour that our analysis predicts? We can an-
swer this question by considering a single individual choosing
from two options when the other members of the group have
already decided. We simply reduce the number of degrees of
freedom in Equation 2 to this single individual, assuming that
A and B agents have already assigned themselves to options
A and B:
P (A | A,B) =
∫ 1
R=0
P (R)RA+1(1−R)B dR. [7]
The result of this calculation for an example case where α = 0
is shown in Figure 5 (a). By inspection, the probability of
choosing A dictated by this rule looks like a Weber’s law [30]
– choosing A in proportion to (A + ε)/(A + B + 2ε). To test
the similarity of our result to this rule, we plot the probability
of choosing A against (A+ 1)/(A+B+ 2) in Figure 5 (b) and
find a perfect match. As α increases the value of ε decreases,
so for α ' 1, ε ' 0. A brief consideration of this rule in the
case of high α shows that it enforces the same consensus as
derived at the group level, since the first agent to commit to
option A or B makes the probability of that option for sub-
sequent agents approximately equal to one, thus causing an
irreversible information cascade.
Collective intelligence. The entropic enforcement of consensus
decisions implies some degree of collective intelligence. To see
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Fig. 6. The increasing proportion of agents avoiding a threat with a low detection
probability (d = 0.1) as a function of group size, for different values of the extinction
probability on the future paths tree. The greater the possibility of one or other of the
future path trees becoming extinct, the greater the cohesive force between the agents,
and thus the stronger the information transfer between the detecting agents and the
others, resulting in improved collective intelligence.
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this, consider the model used by Ward et al. [31] to explain the
collective decisions of groups of varying size. In this ’Many-
Eyes’ model, if any one agent in a group spots a threat, all
agents will avoid it. This implies that the proportion of agents
avoiding a threat should grow in proportion to the probability
that at least one will spot the threat, i.e., 1 − 0.5(1 − d)N ,
where d is the detection probability.
Our model implies a similar result. Since the agents them-
selves are not actively trying to maximise entropy (instead, so-
cial decision rules have evolved that tend to maximise entropy
in general), any agent seeing a threat should avoid it. How-
ever, once this occurs, the general tendency of the other agents
to maintain a consensus means that the group will generally
stick together, with a probability determined by the extinc-
tion probability of the branching process, closely mimicking
the many-eyes model. We can calculate the expected num-
ber of agents avoiding a threat as a function of the extinction
probability, by conditioning Equation 2 on a given number,
Nd, detecting the threat and avoiding it, and weighting by the
probability of that number of detections, given a detection
probability d.
P (A avoid threat) =
N∑
i=0
[(
N
i
)
di(1− d)N−i
×
(
N
A− i
)∫ 1
R=0
P (R)RA−i(1−R)N−A−i dR
]
. [8]
In Figure 6 we plot the implied collective intelligence for dif-
ferent values of the extinction probability, in the case where
any given agent has a d = 0.1 chance of detecting a hidden
threat, as in the example of Ward et al. [31]. The prediction
for high values of α is essentially identical to the prediction of
[31], in that consensus is entirely enforced.
Collective motion: derivation of a social force. Set in a dis-
crete space, the model we describe here does not give im-
mediate quantitative predictions about the types of collective
motion [32] we would expect in a continuous space. However,
we can sketch what such a generalised model would look like.
The choice of which direction to move in is a decision like
any other, but with many possible options. According to the
arguments above, agents in approximately the same spatial lo-
cation – those who will experience the same branching process
of future options based on their choice – should tend to move
in the same direction.
We can imagine that for a given type of agent there is a
typical spatial range over which future trees are strongly cor-
related. We can associate this with the zones of interaction
found in many models of collective motion, such as the classic
Vicsek model [20] and Couzin zonal model [21]. In the case of a
relatively confined environment, individuals outside of the im-
mediate perceptual range may still experience the same future
trees, and this can be expressed in individual interaction terms
via a memory of encounters [33], leading to something akin to
a mean-field model. As for the first question, what interaction
rule individuals use to align their movements, this can be an-
swered at least in general terms from the discussion of social
decision rules above. The interaction must be some form of
Weber’s law, with the probability to adopt a given direction
varying with the proportion of individuals within the interac-
tion zone who have that direction. This is very similar to the
rules that are actually employed in such individual-level mod-
els. For example, in the Couzin model, the alignment force
on an agent along any axis is proportional to the sum of each
other individual’s motion along that axis, divided by the total
number of individuals.
We provide a quantitative special case. Assume that in a
continuous space there are N + 1 agents, of which N are al-
ready committed to a particular position. Where should the
(N + 1)th agent position itself? At each point xi in the space-
direction continuum occupied by an agent in {1, . . . , N}, there
is a probability distribution over the ratio P ( ni∑
j nj
| xi), which
we will assume is equal for all points xi (we will be ignoring
second-order effects where these N agents are influencing each
other, and focus only on the (N + 1)th agent). Let us further
assume a particular form for the distribution P (
nN+1∑
j nj
| xN+1):
with probability βk, this position shares a future tree with po-
sition xk. We take this probability to be defined by a squared
exponential decay function:
βk = exp
(−(xN+1 − xk)2
L
)
. [9]
The probability distribution of possible position choices
xN+1 is determined by a mixture of the possibility that
P (nN+1/
∑
j nj) is independent of all other points, and each
of the possibilities that xN+1 shares a future tree with the po-
sition of another agent. Again ignoring second-order effects,
we have
P (xN+1) ' (1−
∑
k
βk)
〈
nN+1∑
j nj
〉∏
i
〈
ni∑
j nj
〉
+
N∑
k=1
βk
〈(
nk∑
j nj
)2〉∏
i6=k
〈
ni∑
j nj
〉
= µN+1 +
N∑
k=1
βkµ
N−1σ2, [10]
where µ =
〈
ni∑
j nj
〉
and σ2 =
〈(
ni∑
j nj
)2〉
− µ2. We find the
optimal position by maximising P (xN+1), obtaining:
d
dxN+1
N∑
k=1
exp
(−(xN+1 − xk)2
L
)
= 0, [11]
which we identify as the least-squares solution: xN+1 =
1
N
∑N
k=1 xk. Therefore the unique optimal position for agent
N + 1 is the mean position of all the other agents, implying a
social ‘force’ towards this point proportional to Equation ??.
It should be clear that the same argument would apply in re-
lation to the direction choices of other individuals as well, cre-
ating an equivalent ‘social force’ to rotate the agent’s direction
towards the average of the group. If the probability of sharing
future trees were correlated between space and direction, then
a distance-dependent alignment force would emerge.
Discussion
We have demonstrated that the causal entropic principle gives
a purely statistical prediction for many of the emergent proper-
ties of collective behaviour, without any detailed understand-
ing on the mechanisms of interactions between individuals.
Adopting the taxonomy of modelling approaches described by
Sumpter et al. [34], this is a purely global approach to mod-
elling groups and is complementary to a detailed understand-
ing of individual behaviour, rather than a replacement. Our
model takes an entirely novel approach to understanding the
5
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origins of collective behaviour, and makes testable predictions
about the fundamental form of social interactions
Our model predicts that interactions between individuals
take the form of a Weber’s law. This social decision rule has
empirical support in the response to various stimuli of several
species, e.g., insects [35, 36], fish [15], and humans [37, 10, 38],
as well as a solid grounding in the psychophysics of estimat-
ing differences [39, 40, 41]. However, there are other stud-
ies that find that individual decisions are better described by
more non-linear interactions e.g. [11, 12]. Perna et al. [36]
have already shown that an accumulation of Weber’s law in-
teractions, combined with some degree of noise or inaccuracy
(which we would expect in any real system) can lead to appar-
ently non-linear interactions. We therefore suggest that where
non-linear interactions are observed, these may be the result of
an accumulation of smaller-scale Weber interactions. In many
experimental setups involving animal groups, the choices ulti-
mately made by the individuals are not single events, but the
final result of a period of motion where many smaller choices
are made, which supports the idea that the final choice can be
seen as an accumulation of smaller interactions. Simulations
show that the type of linear, Weber-type interactions used in
self-propelled particle models can lead to strongly non-linear
consensus decision making in moving groups [42, 43].
A limitation of our model is the lack of a description of
groups with conflicting information or preferences. Variation
in information or personality in groups has been shown to be a
potentially important driver of collective outcomes [42, 44, 45].
This could potentially be addressed by assigning different be-
liefs to each agent about the probability distribution on fu-
ture trees. However, we have deliberately framed our model
in terms of a consistent rule that produces a maximum entropy
result over all possible futures, rather than assigning entropy-
maximising agency to the individuals themselves. There is no
clear reason for individual agents, animal or human, to de-
sire greater entropy over future paths; rather, we consider it
as a result of uncertainty in which futures may be possible,
and which decisions the agents will take. Nonetheless, the
viewpoint could be relaxed to allow the emergence of a more
sophisticated model including conflicting groups in the future.
The entropic consequences of conflict are therefore an area of
importance for future research in this area.
The model described in this paper gives a simple carica-
ture of the types of decisions that face groups of intelligent
agents. This abstraction is useful for understanding the logic
of how causal entropic maximisation implies group behaviours,
social interactions, and collective intelligence. We have shown
how the model might be generalised to a continuous space
in consideration of collective motion. Such an expansion of
the model could potentially describe the structure of moving
animal groups [46, 47] and patterns of group-level direction
changes [48]. More widely, the causal entropic principle may
provide a general framework for understanding the dynamics
of complex intelligent systems, extending from animal groups,
through organisations such as corporations and governments,
to global human social systems built on the enormous con-
nectivity of the internet. We cannot be sure what series of
choices every animal, pedestrian, car driver, bureaucrat, or
social-network user will make over an extended period of time.
But precisely this ignorance can help us to predict what they
will do next.
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